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The Private Sector, Peacebuilding, 
and Economic Recovery
A Challenge for the UNPBA
Angelika Rettberg 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary1 
The private sector has become the darling of international and domes-
tic organizations seeking strategic partners in building sustainable 
peace, including processes of demobilization of combatants, address-
ing victims’ needs, and rebuilding wrecked economies. Arguments to 
attract the private sector combine economic (companies’ economic 
performance suffers in violent contexts and is likely to improve in 
peaceful environments) with moral dimensions, appealing to compa-
nies’ responsibility in overcoming the causes of armed conflict.  
 
However, boosting economic recovery via private sector engagement 
and engaging the private sector in specific peacebuilding tasks is eas-
ier said than done. Investors shy away from conflict or post-conflict 
settings, and, after a certain threshold of private sector peacebuilding 
activism has been reached, efforts to further engage the private sector 
stall. At the heart of this puzzle is a divergence between economic re-
covery and peacebuilding processes and an imperfect understanding of 
the private sector’s organizational make-up and decision-making 
processes. 
 
At the same time, the importance of the private sector as a crucial 
source of resources, know how, and institutional capacity for building 
peace has not diminished. Business needs peace to thrive but, at the 
same time, peace needs business to progress and consolidate. In light 
of this challenge, the UNPBA should promote: 
 
 Improved understanding of the mechanisms of economic re-
covery and of private sector decision-making in transitional 
processes in order to ensure private sector support and integra-
tion 
 Improved understanding of the types of business sectors and 
companies involved in peacebuilding efforts 
 Picking a pilot sector or peacebuilding task to illustrate how 
peace can gain from business and vice versa 
 Greater coherence and synergy with other peacebuilding insti-
tutions 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  An outline of this paper was presented at the workshop The Future of the UN Peacebuild-
ing Commission (UNPBC), organized by Roland Paris, University of Ottawa, September 
23, 2009. I am grateful to Juan Diego Prieto for his assistance in the preparation of this 
document. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the publication of Jane Nelson’s The Business of Peace: the pri-
vate sector as a partner in conflict prevention and resolution in 2000 
and the first UN resolution on cooperation between the UN and the 
private sector in 2001, the private sector has become the darling of 
international and domestic organizations seeking strategic partners in 
building sustainable peace. Since then, private sector actors – includ-
ing domestic companies of all sizes and sectors, business associations 
representing diverse interests, and multinational companies – have be-
come the targets of increased attention and efforts to become involved 
in peacebuilding activities ranging from processes of demobilization 
of combatants to addressing victims’ needs to rebuilding wrecked 
economies. Arguments to attract the private sector combine economic 
dimensions – the realization that most companies’ economic perform-
ance suffers in violent contexts and the expectation that it will im-
prove in peaceful environments (the peace dividend) – with moral di-
mensions, which appeal to companies’ actual or perceived responsibil-
ity in overcoming the causes of armed conflict and violence in line 
with the general umbrella of corporate social responsibility (Doane 
2005, Vogel 2005).  
 
Within the United Nations (UN), the Global Compact, the set of vol-
untary standards aimed at promoting and making visible best corpo-
rate practice, was launched in 2000. Other institutions at the global 
and the domestic levels have adopted similar codes, policy briefs, and 
recommendations of desirable corporate behavior (such as the Extrac-
tive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Pro-
cess in the diamond industry), underscoring the need to engage the 
private sector and examining how this can and should be done. Also, 
certification schemes – tying access to markets to the compliance with 
human rights and environmental standards – have been implemented 
to induce change in private sector behavior. Common to these initia-
tives is their interest in either promoting good corporate practice (such 
as the Global Compact) or preventing or sanctioning bad corporate 
practice (such as certification schemes seeking to impede access to 
markets for companies violating labor conditions or contributing to 
environmental degradation). 
 
In contrast with these growing efforts, the experience of several coun-
tries and international institutions engaged in peacebuilding seems to 
suggest that both boosting economic recovery via private sector (or, 
more specifically, investor) engagement to provide the material basis 
for sustainable peace and engaging the private sector in specific 
peacebuilding tasks is easier said than done. Regarding the first point, 
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Tripathi (2008) argues that investors tend to shy away from conflict or 
post-conflict settings because volatile contexts fail to provide a mini-
mum of safety for operations and sufficient return on investments. 
Regarding the second point, after a certain threshold of private sector 
peacebuilding activism has been reached, efforts to further engage the 
private sector reach a plateau. The circle of “converted” companies is 
difficult to broaden, companies initially enthusiastic about supporting 
peacebuilding efforts step back from further participation, or compa-
nies flatly reject becoming engaged in peacebuilding efforts.  
 
At the same time, the importance of the private sector as a crucial 
source of resources, know-how, and institutional capacity for building 
peace has not diminished. Plenty of arguments have been made to 
show how, on the one hand, business needs peace to thrive but, at the 
same time, peace needs business to progress and consolidate. What 
explains this gap between the ongoing need for private sector in-
volvement and the limits to sustained private sector engagement in 
peacebuilding? How can it be closed? 
 
In this paper I tackle these issues from the perspective of the UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA to refer collectively to the Peace-
building Commission, the Peace Building Fund and the Peacebuilding 
Support Office). Founded in 2004, the UN Peacebuilding Commission 
has produced a wide variety of documents, many of which refer to the 
importance of including the private sector in peacebuilding tasks as 
well as designing strategies to favor and attract private investment as a 
condition for growth resumption after conflict (UN General Assembly 
2005, UN Peacebuilding Commission 2006). In 2008, a task force was 
created to “focus on tangible ways through which the Commission 
could contribute to the strengthening of the role of the private sector in 
post-conflict peacebuilding, in accordance with the Commission’s 
mandate to bring together all relevant actors to marshal support and 
resources” (UN General Assembly 2008). 
 
While the UNPBC’s documents reflect the prevailing consensus on 
the need to include the private sector as well as an awareness that the 
private sector needs incentives and inducements and cannot be man-
dated into its peacebuilding role, the way in which these issues are 
framed – more general than specific – suggests that in the PBA itself 
the question of defining a private sector road out of conflict is un-
solved. As the body in which the UN System has invested the respon-
sibility to lead peacebuilding activities and in light of the opportunity 
offered by its current evaluation process, this paper will focus on the 
PBA’s role and challenges in promoting conditions for economic re-
covery as a condition for sustainable peace and in garnering private 
sector support for building peace. 
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The paper will thus focus on two aspects of the private sector-
peacebuilding relationship. First, it will examine difficulties related to 
promoting economic recovery by stimulating domestic and interna-
tional private sector actors in conflict or post-conflict countries to pro-
duce and invest in order to reinvigorate economies, termed here indi-
rect peacebuilding (as peacebuilding may be the desired outcome for 
policymakers but not the main motivation for corporate actors, who 
primarily seek a safe return on investment). To this respect, the paper 
will question the assumption that, were it not for conflict, market 
forces could be unleashed and would yield favorable results to post-
conflict societies yearning for growth and progress. The paper will 
suggest that domestic private sectors – their structures of incentives, 
their practice and strategy – may have either adapted to conflict or re-
main undeveloped. This poor supply of entrepreneurial endowment 
(Acs 2006, Audretsch, Keilbach & Lehmann 2006) – not just of op-
portunity – in underdeveloped, conflict-ridden societies brings to the 
forefront an old debate on what is needed for peace, what is needed 
for development and where the two intersect.  
 
Second, the paper will discuss aspects directly related to engaging the 
private sector in peacebuilding tasks such as employment creation for 
demobilized combatants or victims of armed conflicts, preferential 
investment in post-conflict development in affected communities, sub-
scription of codes of good corporate behavior, or alliances between 
private sector foundations and other civil society organizations. Diffi-
culties here are related to lack of trust in the peacebuilding processes 
and actors and fear of spoilers overall but also to an estimation of cost 
in terms of time and resources invested and risks faced. In addition, 
even when private sector partners trust the process and are willing to 
invest resources in peacebuilding they may still not know how to do it. 
As suggested by Tripathi (2008, 85), “companies are not peacebuild-
ing institutions”. As a result, potential private sector partners may ex-
press support of peacebuilding initiatives but may shy away from be-
coming actively involved. Others may simply decide not to become 
involved because they hope that someone else, such as the national 
state or the international community, will take on the costs associated 
with sustainably building peace (free riding) or because they benefit 
from conflict-related activities (opportunism).2 
 
To analyze these two versions of the private sector-peacebuilding rela-
tionship and how they reflect a gap between the norm and the practice 
of peacebuilding as illustrated in the case of the PBA, this paper will 
first review the academic and practitioner literature regarding the role 
                                                 
2  This is similar to the distinction drawn by Cedric de Coning between “two very different 
operational models, namely targeted and systemic peacebuilding” (see Cedric de Coning, 
Clarity,Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding in this 
same working paper series). 
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of the private sector in peacebuilding. Then the paper reviews the 
highlights of the development of international norms and standards 
regarding the private sector’s role in peacebuilding, including what the 
UNPBC and other international institutions have said about the private 
sector. Third, the paper presents in greater detail the difficulties and 
constraints emerging from the practice of stimulating economic recov-
ery as a condition for stable peace and attracting the private sector to 
peacebuilding. Findings are summarized in the conclusions. 
 
 
 
II. The private sector and peacebuild-
ing: Peace needs business, business 
needs peace 
The relationship between the private sector, conflict, and peacebuild-
ing has received increased scholarly attention. Following the publica-
tion of Nelson’s (2000) seminal work, articles by Gerson (2001) and 
by NGOs such as FAFO (Taylor, ed. 2003), Global Witness3 and Ox-
fam (2007) have raised attention about the links between private actor 
economic behavior and the promotion of armed conflict.  
 
Conflict in many societies has historically revolved around the alloca-
tion of privileges accrued to members of the economic elites. In this 
sense, business as a defender of the status quo is a prime factor in ex-
plaining internal conflicts as illustrated, for example, by studies of 
Latin American, African, and Asian oligarchies, which made system-
atic use of coercion to repress popular protest and protect their privi-
leges (Gomez, ed. 2002, Marais 2001, Paige 1997). 
 
The novel thing about the more current literature is that it looks at 
how business promotes conflict in still other ways: To the extent that 
societies depend on investment, governments recurrently engage in 
actions to protect private interests, both national and transnational, of-
ten with a cost to citizens. The killing, in 1995, of popular leaders by 
the Nigerian official forces to protect oil giant’s Royal Dutch/Shell’s 
operations in Nigeria is an emblematic example of this (Wheeler, 
Fabig & Boele 2002). Spawned by this and similar cases a rich litera-
ture on the participation of companies in the trade of resources that 
have been linked to conflict, such as “blood” diamonds, oil, drugs, 
timber, and coltan has emerged, linked to a political economy of 
                                                 
3   See their multiple reports about natural resources and armed conflict on their website: 
http://www.globalwitness.org 
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armed conflicts framework (Berdal 2005, De Soysa 2000, Ballentine 
2003, Humphreys 2005, Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005, Pugh, 
Cooper & Turner, eds. 2008). In addition, private sector funding of 
private security companies in unstable contexts has been researched 
(Center for Public Integrity 2002, Singer 2003). Other examples of 
how business contributes to conflict are payment of bribes to gain lu-
crative contracts and money laundering, which deviate funds from de-
velopmental or peaceful purposes (Le Billon 2003, Schwartz & Gibb 
1999, Shankelman 2007).  
 
However, inasmuch as it controls and generates capital, and because it 
can and has spoiled peacebuilding processes (Rettberg 2007), business 
has been recognized to be a key partner in overcoming conflict. In the 
domestic realm, private sector support, both material and nominal, has 
been found to be crucial for peacebuilding activity to prosper (Azam 
et al. 1994, Gerson 2001, Gündüz, Killick & Banfield, eds. 2006, 
Pearce 1999, Rettberg 2004). Private sector development is a corner-
stone of economic recovery plans in post-conflict societies (HPCR 
International 2009, Godnick & Klein 2009) and is expected to gener-
ate the required material basis for making peacebuilding policies vi-
able and sustainable, especially in the face of diminishing interna-
tional support and funding (UN Development Programme 2005, 
2008:5). Many reforms that have been recommended in post-conflict 
phases are premised on the need to stimulate and protect dormant or 
nascent private sector activity. In addition, because of its managerial 
know how, because it can provide employment and make needed in-
vestments, but also because it provides political legitimacy to con-
tested peacebuilding policy processes, the private sector is treated as a 
necessary partner in these activities.  
 
How to bring business aboard the peacebuilding agenda is less clear, 
as revealed by an accumulating number of case studies on experiences 
of business involvement and emerging lessons (Gündüz, Killick & 
Banfield, eds., 2006). Efforts to overcome conflict hinge on policy-
makers’ ability to convey a moral obligation to business (in the way 
that corporate social responsibility frameworks do, pointing out the 
traits of the globally responsible corporate citizen – Bendell 2005, 
Tripathi 2008), and on business willingness to pay for many of the 
costs peacebuilding implies or at least refrain from hindering peace to 
advance. Costs include tangible expenses such as potentially higher 
taxes, but also opportunity costs and higher risk. For multinational 
companies, one decision to be made is whether to stay or to move op-
erations elsewhere. In addition, a peace dividend (actual or expected) 
needs to be conveyed to the private sector as a necessary condition for 
(re)activating productive activity in a war-torn country, fostering capi-
tal repatriation, and, more generally, for private sector peacebuilding 
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to occur (Azam et al. 1994). In this sense, marketing peace to the pri-
vate sector as a profitable undertaking becomes one of the crucial 
challenges facing policymakers seeking to build durable peace.  
 
Doing so effectively is more complicated than adding up destroyed 
infrastructure, attacks and lives lost, as is common in studies on the 
costs of conflict (Collier 1999, Collier et al. 2003, Pinto, Vergara & 
Lahuerta 2004, Stewart & FitzGerald, eds. 2001). Rettberg (2008) 
suggests how even when costs to private sector activity related with 
armed conflict are high, this is still insufficient to generate massive 
private sector participation in peacebuilding. On the one hand, con-
flicts of long duration seem to generate the internalization of conflict 
costs, making it difficult for policymakers to convey the company-
specific loss associated with conflict. In addition, armed conflicts are 
not synonymous to overall deterioration: specific sectors benefit from 
the turmoil and will actively oppose peacebuilding efforts and certain 
regions of a given country may remain unharmed. From weapon sales 
to security provision, and from warlords controlling trade in specific 
regions to insurance providers, the range of private sector actors and 
activities benefiting from unstable contexts is wide and diverse 
(Richani 2005, Singer 2003, Small Arms Survey 2009). Also, costs 
are often more of an indirect than of a direct nature: attacks on com-
panies or personnel are infrequent, whereas transaction and opportu-
nity costs are more frequent yet more difficult to measure, to attribute, 
and to use for private sector mobilization. The public-good quality of 
peace (once obtained, nobody can be excluded from enjoying peace’s 
positive effects, regardless of whether s/he has paid its cost – see Ol-
son 1971) is a fourth factor diminishing the weight of the moral argu-
ment often made by CSR practitioners and therefore hampering pri-
vate sector involvement, because it may generate a preference for 
delegating costs and action to others (such as the state, the interna-
tional community, or other private sector actors). Finally, differences 
within the private sector may explain different preferences and capaci-
ties faced with a context of conflict. In general, as suggested by neo-
institutionalists (Thelen & Steinmo 2002, Schneider 2004, 2009), 
preferences depend on size, sector, organizational features, orienta-
tion, relations with the state, and ability to relocate or divert invest-
ments (Mahon 1996, Shafer 1997, Hirschman 1970). This suggests 
that companies facing conflict have diverse options, choose different 
strategies, and experience varying degrees of effectiveness. In sum, 
the private sector – and entrepreneurs in particular – is/are not a ho-
mogeneous category and require a differentiated approach from schol-
ars and policymakers seeking to identify the proper incentives to pro-
duce private sector involvement in peacebuilding. 
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Finally, there is also the need to consider the fact that many conflict-
torn countries are also first and foremost underdeveloped countries 
with poor entrepreneurial endowments. Acs (2006) and others 
(Audretsch, Keilbach & Lehmann 2006, Baliamoune-Lutz 2009) dis-
tinguish between necessity entrepreneurship (such as self-employment 
due to lack of formal employment options) and opportunity entrepre-
neurship (such as where the available institutional framework allows 
potential entrepreneurs to develop innovative ideas and business plans 
choosing among several options). The distinction is important because 
economic growth is positively associated with opportunity entrepre-
neurship. In underdeveloped societies, necessity entrepreneurship pre-
vails and conditions for the development of opportunity entrepreneur-
ship are limited (due to, for example, poorly developed capital mar-
kets, low investment capacity, and low knowledge capital). This adds 
an important caveat to expectations that economic recovery initiatives 
in underdeveloped and conflict-torn countries will be sufficient to 
promote the kind of private sector behavior expected by peacebuilding 
promoters. 
 
In line with the previous paragraphs, several factors emerge as condi-
tions underlying efforts designed to enlist the private sector as a force 
of economic recovery and to involve the private sector in peacebuild-
ing. On the one hand, as for any other civil society actor, trust in the 
process is essential. This poses a challenge to the political abilities of 
peacebuilders in the building of alliances and agreements among very 
diverse stakeholder, including business. On the other hand, aspects 
related to the state of the transitional economy require attention, too. 
This refers to the extent to which a war system has developed linking 
business interests to the continuation of conflict, the level of entrepre-
neurial capacity, the degree to which a basic infrastructure for eco-
nomic recovery is in place, and the level of institutional development. 
It also refers to the make-up of the private sector, in general, and of 
specific companies, in particular. Sectoral differences, such as the 
prevalence of rural or urban operations, the diversification of sectors 
from agricultural activities to trade, financial or service activities, the 
magnitude of the presence of international companies and the degree 
to which economic activity is linked to and dependent on international 
markets all play a role both in defining whether peacebuilders will 
find friendly ears within private sectors active in conflict-torn coun-
tries and in identifying the more likely private sector partners in post-
conflict peacebuilding. 
 
In the next section, the paper will describe some of the global efforts, 
specifically within the UN system, to promote private sector involve-
ment in peacebuilding. 
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III. The private sector as the darling of 
peacebuilding and economic  
recovery 
Economic recovery as a condition for durable peace has been pro-
moted at least since the Second World War (Hogan 1987), explaining 
such massive international investment endeavors as the Marshall Plan 
to rebuild the devastated European post-war economy and halt the ad-
vance of communism (Mills 2008). In the past ten years, international 
norms, standards, and agreements have complemented this concern by 
increasingly referring to the need for direct engagement of the private 
sector as an economic force in peacebuilding. Today, it is uncommon 
for a self-respecting international agreement to fail to include even a 
cursory reference to the private sector. 
 
In 2000 the Millennium Development Goals were signed to reduce 
extreme poverty and included the resolution to “develop strong part-
nerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations in 
pursuit of development and poverty eradication” (UN General Assem-
bly 2000, Nelson & Prescott 2008). Also in 2000 the UN Global 
Compact was launched. This is a “strategic policy initiative for busi-
nesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies 
with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, 
labor, environment and anti-corruption” (UN Global Compact 2009). 
Today, the UN Global Compact stands as the “largest corporate citi-
zenship and sustainability initiative in the world –with over 7,700 cor-
porate participants and stakeholders from over 130 countries”. It 
“seeks to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral author-
ity and convening power, with the private sector’s solution-finding 
strengths, and the expertise and capacities of a range of key stake-
holders”.  
 
In addition, multi-stakeholder initiatives – including companies, civil 
society organizations, states, and international organizations – have 
been developed in specific sectors and regions of the world. The Vol-
untary Principles for Security and Human Rights, developed in 2004, 
are a set of non-binding principles “to guide companies in maintaining 
the safety and security of their operations within an operating frame-
work that ensures respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms”4. The Business Leaders’ Initiative on Human Rights, active 
from March 2003 to March 2009, sought to develop practical mecha-
                                                 
4  Read more on the principles at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org 
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nisms to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a 
business context (BLIHR 2009). The Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative5 (first put forward in 2003) seeks to support “improved 
governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full 
publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, 
gas and mining”. And the Kimberley Process Certification System in 
the diamond industry (Wright 2004), “a joint initiative to stem the 
flow of conflict diamonds” mandates “extensive requirements on its 
members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as 
‘conflict-free’”.6 Some industries, such as the extractive sector (in-
cluding oil, coal, and timber), have adopted “do-no-harm” policies in 
which businesses, regardless of their record, submit to review pro-
cesses to ensure that their corporate practices will not contribute to 
local instability and conflict (International Alert 2005). All these ini-
tiatives and others share an interest in combining rewards (affirming 
moral authority, pleasing stockholders, and earning a good reputation 
among consumers) with punishments (facing difficulty to access cer-
tain markets and bad reputation in the international community) to in-
duce desired private sector behavior.  
 
The functioning of these agreements and standards is based on grow-
ing demands for socially responsible corporate behavior by stockhold-
ers, consumers, and civil society organizations alike in countries in 
where these codes originated: Europe (especially Germany and the 
United Kingdom) and North America (especially Canada). Member 
companies tend to have a comparatively better social or environmental 
record while the bulk of the global business community – especially in 
specific sectors or from different nationalities, such as the Chinese – 
remains outside the virtuous circle (Tripathi 2008:96, Ruggie 2007). 
These initiatives also share the handicap of their mostly voluntary na-
ture, which obstructs evaluation and monitoring processes. However, 
the initiatives have been effective in increasing private sector in-
volvement in peacebuilding efforts all over the world, from Northern 
Ireland to Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Mozambique, and Colombia 
(Alexander, Gündüz & Subedi 2009, Amarasuriya, Gündüz & Mayer 
2009, Ben-Porat 2005, Rettberg 2006, 2009). 
 
The outburst of initiatives seeking to induce private sector involve-
ment in peacebuilding is, however, no guarantee of actual knowledge 
of the required conditions for activating the private sector in transi-
tional economies, of how the private sector works, what its potential is 
in terms of peacebuilding, and what can or should not be expected 
from the private sector (such as asking it to give up earning returns on 
investments as a demonstration of its sincere interest in peace, which 
                                                 
5  Read more at http://eitransparency.org/eiti 
6  Read more at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
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is equal to renouncing to the capitalist nature of the global economic 
system, ref.).  
 
The disconnect between initiatives seeking private sector involvement 
without a full understanding of the mechanisms of economic recovery 
and corporate decision-making processes lies at the heart of a division 
of labor within the international community between organizations 
pursuing macroeconomic strategies, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and those institutions in charge of 
local and more context-related development and peacebuilding involv-
ing political negotiation with difficult stakeholders, such as the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) and the PBA.  
 
The division of labor may in part be intended (Paris 2001) and may in 
part be the result of institutional inertia typical of a complex system 
that has developed across decades (see Alger 2006, Gerson and Col-
letta 2001) and in part be related with the professions, methodologies, 
and data used in each group of institutions (more econometric and 
quantitative studies in the first camp, more qualitative and small-N 
analysis in the second camp). In the process of designing policy to ad-
dress the needs of transitional countries, the divide is reflected in that 
some organizations place insufficient emphasis on getting the econ-
omy running as a facilitating condition for private sector involvement 
(for example, when the World Bank’s work on the economic dimen-
sion fails to feed into peacebuilding policy or when the UNDP’s focus 
on inclusive markets materializes in) while others pay limited atten-
tion to the fact that economic recovery and sustainable peace depend, 
to a large extent, on the political ability of peacebuilders to negotiate 
alliances and support and neutralize spoilers within the private sector, 
in addition to the technical merit of their proposal.  
 
In practice, the gap may explain why business involvement in peace-
building initiatives tends to stall after a certain threshold: as reflected 
in the experience of institutions and countries seeking to engage the 
private sector in peacebuilding, only very specific companies tend to 
heed the call (Berman 2000, Haufler 2001, Killick, Srikantha & 
Gündüz 2005, Jamali & Mirshak 2009, Rettberg 2004, Sherman 
2001). Those who do become involved fall into one or more of the 
following categories: 1) They are generally tied to and dependent on 
international trade and consumer networks that punish “bad” corporate 
behavior with decreasing company earnings or access to markets; 2) 
they are of comparatively larger size (a predictor of greater investment 
capacity in peacebuilding activity and of exposure to risk); 3) they 
have developed philanthropic traditions predisposing them to assume 
peacebuilding responsibilities, and 4) they face a greater cost to opera-
tions as a result of armed conflict or associated economic and political 
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turmoil. With a few exceptions (as in the oil industry which pioneered 
peacebuilding initiatives in response to international scandal surround-
ing Human Rights violations linked to oil operations), involved com-
panies tend not to be the main culprits within the business community: 
unless they are linked to international networks, domestic companies 
most frequently associated with contributing to conflict are also most 
reluctant to assume responsibility in peacebuilding.  
 
In addition, when and once companies have become involved, a press-
ing question for policymakers and activists becomes how to keep them 
involved and avoid desertion. Different reports on efforts to promote 
business involvement in peacebuilding illustrate that institutions have 
learned from past experience and that they have realized that bringing 
the private sector to peacebuilding also requires attention to the task of 
keeping it there. In this regard, organizations have proposed that pri-
vate sector actors should do what they know and not be expected to 
assume roles they are unprepared for (Berman 2000, Tripathi 2008). 
One example of this accumulated learning relates to the role of the 
private sector in providing employment for demobilized combatants 
(Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned 
2009). Once a standard recommendation, this has been put on hold in 
light of the difficulties and hardship experienced by companies and 
governments seeking to turn former combatants or criminals into law 
abiding workers (Puentes, Moreno, Rivas & Márquez 2009). Thus, 
new options to attract the private sector include investment in demobi-
lization funds for productive projects. As a result, much like what has 
happened in the broader CSR movement (Vogel 2006, Doane 2005), 
the private sector’s role in peacebuilding has tended to focus on activi-
ties related to core operations, hiring policies and investment. 
 
In sum, after an initial “enchantment” the private sector peacebuilding 
crowd has tended to stabilize instead of growing as expected by poli-
cymakers and activists and needed for economic recovery after con-
flict. In addition, it has specialized in certain sectors and tasks, instead 
of branching out into different activities and sectors. Not involved, or 
not sufficiently involved, is a large number of companies that are, on 
average, smaller, less connected to global markets and more depend-
ent on domestic markets yet more disarticulated amongst each other, 
and that often benefit from political instability or thrive despite con-
flict. They are not the entrepreneurs economic recovery relies on but 
they can spoil economic recovery efforts. There is no precise measure 
of the percentage these private sector actors comprise, but judging 
from the numbers of member companies reported by initiatives aimed 
at involving business into peacebuilding, they may well be the major-
ity. 
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The previous paragraphs bring home a fundamental dilemma that was 
made clear by then Secretary General Kofi Annan’ statement to the 
Security Council of the United Nations (UN Security Council 2004) in 
2004: “the bottom lines of private corporations could no longer be 
separated from such key goals of the United Nations as peace, devel-
opment and equity”. In addition, he said “business itself has an enorm-
ous stake in the search for solutions”, adding that companies required 
a stable environment in order to conduct their operations and mini-
mize their risks. The following section addresses how this dilemma 
plays itself out within the UNPBA. 
 
 
 
IV. The UNPBA and private sector 
peacebuilding: Neither economic re-
covery nor private sector mobilization 
The UN PBA’s approach to private sector peacebuilding reflects the 
larger context described in the previous sections. Founded in 2004 in 
response to the need to centralize peace-building authority and allevi-
ating organizational problems (Paris 2001), the PBA has faced severe 
criticism that it has not lived up to the expectations (Berdal 2008, refs 
to other chapters in the book). Currently active in four African coun-
tries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra 
Leone), the PBA is undergoing a process of revision seeking to pro-
vide recommendations designed to strengthen its role in peacebuild-
ing. 
 
The role of the private sector as a partner for peacebuilding was ad-
dressed by the UNPBC in 2008 (UN General Assembly, par. 19), 
when a task force facilitated by Indonesia was called upon to recom-
mend a strategy for private sector involvement in peacebuilding. Its 
objectives were to  
 
examine the various forms of contributions by the private sector, particularly 
for consolidation of peace and resource mobilization, 2) focus on the possible 
catalytic and advocacy role of the PBC to encourage private sector engage-
ment in post-conflict situations, and 3) define the scope of the Commission's 
advice in this field” (PBC Organizational Committee 2008). 
 
As a result of the task force’s work, it was decided that consideration 
would include three specific areas: microfinance, remittances and 
partnerships with private foundations. The accompanying concept 
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note (PBC Organizational Committee 2008) for the meeting is helpful 
in tracing the motivations underlying this choice.  
 
In line with the international consensus, the note states that  
 
the private sector is a critical, but often an underutilized, actor in peacebuild-
ing. If effectively engaged, it can play a significant role in filling a key gap 
between peacebuilding and medium- to longer-term economic recovery and 
development. In that light, promoting the role of the private sector is an im-
portant element of the PBC's mandate to bring all relevant actors together to 
marshal support and resources and to enhance coordination for sustainable 
peacebuilding (p.1). 
 
Regarding the role of microfinance, the note states that  
 
foreign microfinance institutions that invest in microfinance banks in fragile 
countries, thereby creating the conditions for economic recovery even in the 
most fragile and remote environments; or small private equity deals often 
linked with foreign investments in the infrastructure or commodity sectors 
(p.3)  
 
can bring additional resources toward peacebuilding and creating do-
mestic wealth. Regarding remittances, the note states that they  
 
can also feed into private sector development. The diaspora from several 
post-conflict countries has been increasingly active by creating "hometown 
associations" that invest in local business development and share their 
knowledge, technology and skills (p.4).  
 
However, the note cautions that  
 
leveraging the impact of remittances is difficult because most senders and re-
ceivers, including beneficiary micro enterprises, remain outside the formal 
financial system. Overall, there is seldom any money transfer strategy be-
tween remittances, private sector development and peacebuilding (p. 4).  
 
Finally, regarding private foundations and philanthropy, the note 
states that they  
 
are also important sources of funding that can benefit peacebuilding in post-
conflict countries. In recent years, the development community has been wit-
nessing the rapid growth of private philanthropy (p.3-4).  
 
However, the note continues that  
 
only a limited share of foundations' grant giving goes to international devel-
opment and the most fragile states are often neglected. How increased flows 
from these sources could be channeled toward post-conflict countries and 
their peacebuilding priorities, thus, remains an open question (p. 4). 
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In light of arguments put forth in the previous sections and in light of 
some of the questions the note itself raises, I will now discuss this 
orientation given to private sector and peacebuilding by the UNPBC. 
 
Even before it earned economist Muhammad Yunus a Nobel Prize, 
microfinance has been publicized as an alternative road out of pov-
erty and underdevelopment (Brau & Woller 2004, Hammond et al. 
2007, Lodge & Wilson 2006, Prahalad 2004, UNDP 2008, Yunus 
2006). Advocates have underscored its contribution to the building of 
social capital and community empowerment by improving the welfare 
and income of individuals and communities. However, its role in 
overcoming poverty is less well documented and economists in insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
as well as elsewhere, continue recommending old fashioned macro-
economic policy focusing on fiscal adjustment, export promotion, and 
revenue raising (Karnani 2007, 2009; Khawari 2004, World Bank 
2007).  
 
From the perspective of the scale of resources required for economic 
recovery and peacebuilding, microfinance seems difficult to sustain: 
First, its focus on the household level does not provide large inflows 
of capital and investment needed in post-conflict settings. Second, it is 
slow in yielding results. Third, and until it reaches sustainability (if it 
does), microfinance depends on the ongoing disposition of investors 
and funders. Fourth, its focus on community projects and subsistence 
activities does not generate the kind of large infrastructure and re-
construction projects required in post-conflict settings. Fifth, at the 
local level it often competes with alternative informal economic acti-
vities linked to illegal, perhaps more lucrative activities (Lindley 
2009). Finally, it does not unleash entrepreneurial capacity on a mas-
sive scale, such as that required by economic recovery and peacebuil-
ding efforts, as described above. 
 
Remittances refer to the portion of migrants’ earnings sent from their 
place of residence to their place of origin to support families and 
friends remaining in the conflict country (Turner 2008). In post-
conflict countries such as El Salvador a steady flow of remittances has 
been associated with providing the economic backbone for impove-
rished communities and relief for weak states unable to address social 
demands (Fagen & Bump 2006, Orozco 2002). They are often “seen 
as an inventive way of bypassing corrupt elites and political structu-
res, thus ensuring that resources go directly to those in need” (Turner 
2008: 175). Although they alleviate economic pressure on sectors of 
transitional societies, remittances are not the kind of investment most 
keenly needed in post-conflict settings to overcome the structural heri-
tage of conflict. They tend to be spent on consumer and subsistence 
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goods, are not reflected in greater savings or investments, are often 
not declared to and taxed by the state and, thus, do not strengthen the 
state’s fiscal resources to invest for example in DDR; they remain an 
informal income not linked to activating economic processes, capital 
and investment flows, and fail to have a redistributive impact, especi-
ally in countries with weak economic and political institutions (Bara-
jas et al. 2009, Catrinescu et al. 2009). Remittances are also highly 
vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. Additionally, Collier et al. 
(2003: 162) have pointed out that, although diasporas can play a pro-
ductive role in economic reconstruction, they can also be “an impor-
tant risk factor in post-conflict societies”, considering some diasporic 
communities’ record of supporting and financing violent political or-
ganizations through remittances.  
 
Finally, private foundations have been champions of the peacebuild-
ing cause both at an international and at a domestic level (Greenberg 
2006). Consequently, they are often among the primary and most will-
ing partners of peacebuilding organizations seeking private sector en-
gagement. In contrast with member companies, foundations often 
have developed skills for political negotiation among stakeholders in 
peacebuilding. However, like companies, foundations have an agenda 
to further, which may or may not be aligned with that of peacebuild-
ing institutions. As companies, they need to be held accountable by 
their executive boards, who want to see a return on their social in-
vestment, a difficult task in volatile post-conflict settings marked by 
uncertainty and lack of clarity on political and economic rules. In ad-
dition, foundations have a private, not a public agenda. Its components 
may but need not be aligned with overall peacebuilding policy put 
forth by states and international organizations in terms of focus and 
methods. Therefore, the existence of foundations does not relieve 
states and international organizations from defining goals, standards, 
and evaluation procedures. Dependent as they are on member compa-
nies’ continuing willingness and ability to support foundation efforts, 
foundations often suffer from funding shortages, especially when eco-
nomic crisis makes companies wary about philanthropic giving (see 
Wall Street Journal, 9 November 2009). Finally, although they can 
promote and publicize private sector involvement in peacebuilding 
tasks, foundations are not actors or leaders of economic recovery, 
which is a task that requires macro and microeconomic incentives and 
needs to be promoted by states, international funding institutions, and 
companies. 
 
In sum, the UNPBC´s commitment to including the private sector in 
peacebuilding tasks reflects the prevailing consensus in the interna-
tional community and among many private sector actors of the devel-
oped world. It is also an important shift away from security-related 
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programming, as criticized by Aning and Lartey’s chapter. Its focus 
on microfinance, remittances, and private foundations as stimulants of 
private sector engagement in peacebuilding, however, falls short of its 
potential role in capitalizing on accumulated lessons on the mutual 
effects between private sector activity and economic recovery for 
peacebuilding and on mobilizing private sector support for specific 
peacebuilding tasks. Specifically, the recommendation to pursue these 
three types of activities appears to be at odds with available empirical 
evidence on the nature and impact of the proposed mechanisms. Also, 
some of these mechanisms appear to be contrary to an overarching 
concern in peacebuilding, which is strengthening the state and its po-
litical, social, and economic institutions. The three activities proposed 
in the note have been identified as leading to state substitution, not 
state strengthening.  
 
The following section will outline some of the ways in which the 
UNPBA could play an innovative and converging role in reinvigorat-
ing the links between economic recovery, peacebuilding and the pri-
vate sector. 
 
 
 
V. The potential of the UNPBA 
There is no set of institutions like the UNPBA in terms of centralizing 
peacebuilding as the prime mission in its mandate. The upcoming 
2010 revision process is a unique opportunity to reflect about how the 
UNPBA can develop its full potential, especially regarding the sus-
tainable engagement of the private sector in direct and indirect peace-
building. The considerations presented below should be read from two 
perspectives: the divergence discussed above between institutions pur-
suing economic recovery for peacebuilding and those seeking more 
targeted private sector participation in peacebuilding, on the one hand, 
and the resulting difficulty in broadening the group of private sector 
partners of peacebuilding, on the other. This paper suggests that the 
UNPBA should lead the way at the global level by integrating lessons 
from both camps of the peacebuilding community and promoting di-
rect and indirect peacebuilding with the private sector. 
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Improved knowledge and understanding of the mechanisms 
of economic recovery and of private sector decision-making 
in transitional processes in order to ensure private sector 
support and integration into economic recovery and peace-
building strategy 
Peacebuilding is an endeavor that is still highly contested and insuffi-
ciently understood. As discussed above, there is significant divergence 
between institutions pursuing tasks related with peacebuilding in 
terms of issues, methods, and standards. As related to the subject of 
this paper, the private sector, one tangible result of this gap may be the 
difficulty to broaden the group of companies – domestic and interna-
tional – supporting economic recovery aimed at peacebuilding or spe-
cific peacebuilding tasks. The reasons for this difficulty, suggested 
above, can be found in an insufficient understanding of the workings 
of economic recovery processes and of the motivations underlying 
business strategy in volatile contexts and in unrealistic expectations as 
to the capability and willingness of the private sector to support these 
processes.  
 
To bridge this gap, the UNPBC could promote an improved under-
standing and communication among both camps, for the sake of im-
proved peacebuilding strategy towards the private sector. Drawing 
from management sciences, political science, and economics, an in-
terdisciplinary approach could significantly help avoid the recurrent 
bottlenecks faced by efforts to broaden the pool of private sector part-
ners in peacebuilding and identifying the links (and tensions) between 
economic recovery and peacebuilding efforts. In addition, an inte-
grated approach will allow answering overarching questions such as: 
Is the organizational make-up of the private sector and the incentives 
structure governing private sector activity (i.e. ongoing risk associated 
with resilient conflict, fiscal structure, investment capacity, return on 
investments, foreign loans) favoring the development of economic 
mechanisms and processes suited for building lasting peace? Is peace-
building strategy towards the private sector taking into consideration 
the constraints of transitional economies (limits to funding, disarticu-
lation of commercial and trading networks, loss of trust, weak institu-
tions, illegal activity) and the particularities (sectoral diversity, struc-
ture of ownership, degree of informality) of the domestic private sec-
tor? Finally, an integrated approach will make possible the harmoniza-
tion of recommendations coming out of each group, so as to avoid in-
action as a result of misunderstanding.  
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Improved knowledge and understanding of the types of 
business sectors and companies involved in peacebuilding 
efforts 
Much too often, as revealed throughout this paper, and as reflected 
even in the UNPBC taskforce’s recommendations on the subject, the 
“private sector” means different things to different people. To cor-
roborate findings presented in this paper, the UNPBC should commis-
sion a study to provide a portrait of businesses involved in peacebuild-
ing. The study should identify the most recurrent private sector part-
ners of peacebuilding across countries and initiatives. This would also 
yield insight on the most likely spoilers. A study of this kind would be 
useful to avoid some of the shortcomings of the literature on and prac-
tice of the private sector in peacebuilding, such as the “disproportion-
ate focus on TNCs” and “the primary perceptions of the private sector 
as either agent of economic development divorced from the wider 
peacebuilding process, or else negative drivers of conflict” (Killick, 
Srikantha & Gündüz 2005: 20). The comparative study would proba-
bly find that only a critical mass of a given private sector is needed to 
support peacebuilding efforts, as opposed to large sectors and activi-
ties tied to economic recovery efforts. 
 
In producing this portrait, the UNPBA would do well in avoiding the 
naming and shaming typical in some civil society circles or regarding 
specific types of industry. While denouncing illegal or conflict-
enticing behavior is vital for affirming the rule of law in transitional 
contexts and providing guidance on acceptable corporate behavior, too 
often simplistic generalization hurts the development of desperately 
needed partnerships in mutual learning processes. Again, paying atten-
tion to macro incentive structures giving rise to certain kinds of corpo-
rate behavior may prove more useful than strictly normative ap-
proaches (better reserved for other institutions in the global system) 
for effecting change in business strategy, protecting vulnerable alli-
ances with potentially resistant private sector actors, and broadening 
groups beyond the already converted. In addition to a profound under-
standing of the history giving rise to the particular political economy 
of conflict-torn countries, this would also aid in designing a compel-
ling economic argument for peace and provide elements for a political 
strategy for private sector involvement in peacebuilding.  
Pick a pilot sector or pilot peacebuilding task to illustrate 
how peace can gain from business and vice versa 
In order to focus the use of limited resources and build a successful 
record, the UNPBA could pick a fraction of the private sector or a 
specific peacebuilding task relevant to private sector activity to build 
its own capacity, expertise, and authority with other peacebuilding in-
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stitutions and within the private sector. A sector with links to interna-
tional markets and a task such as DDR would be best suited for such a 
combined piloting and consolidating exercise. This would also allow 
the UNPBA to broaden its scope of action and seek out intermediate 
country cases. Currently, the UNPBA is involved in African countries 
on the lower end of the development frontier (all of whose GDP per 
capita are less than 800 USD – World Bank 2009). Needs in these 
countries are huge and entail tasks of a political, social, and economic 
nature.  
However, in order to affirm authority at the global level, develop 
peacebuilding strategy in lieu with existing private sector partners, 
facilitate its task and diversify its portfolio, instances like the General 
Assembly, the Secretary General, the Security Council, ECOSOC, or 
specific interested countries may be well advised to suggest expanding 
the UNPBA’s focus for example to some Latin American countries, 
such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. In the case of 
Colombia, a country still engulfed by conflict but pursuing peace-
building tasks in DDR, transitional justice, and reparations, a compre-
hensive peace accord putting an end to the conflict – a requirement for 
UNPBC attention to a country – is not foreseeable in the near future. 
However, the country’s multiple peacebuilding needs, the Colombian 
conflict’s regional implications, its intermediate state mechanisms, 
and its comparatively diverse and complex private sector make it an 
excellent candidate for UNPBA attention. 
Greater coherence and synergy with other peacebuilding  
institutions 
While representatives of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the International Financial Corporation of the World Bank 
and the United Nations Foundations of International Partnerships have 
been invited to UNPBC meetings where they presented areas for pos-
sible partnerships between their respective entities and the UNPBC to 
promote the engagement of the domestic and international private sec-
tors in peacebuilding, there is surprisingly little convergence among 
institutions and mutual learning in peacebuilding issues. This is no 
news for students and practitioners within the UN system (and is also 
addressed in other chapters of this book, e.g. Cedric de Coning), but 
comes out with yet an additional twist in this paper, which examined 
the divergence regarding the possible role of the private sector in 
peacebuilding and economic recovery.  
 
The resulting recommendation is obvious and urgent: the identifica-
tion and strengthening by the UNPBA of links with other UN and in-
ternational organizations (such as the UNDP, the World Bank) which 
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have accumulated private sector and peacebuilding experience and 
knowledge for the purpose of cross-fertilization and mutual and im-
proved understanding and synergy in strategies. Included in the group 
of potential partners of the UNPBA in dealing with peacebuilding, 
private sector, and economic recovery should also be agencies fighting 
illegal international networks in drugs or weapons, such as UNODC, 
in order to understand the structures of incentives subjacent to illegal, 
often criminal, war systems impeding private sector transformation 
and mobilization for economic recovery of transitional societies, in 
general, and for peacebuilding, in particular. The debate should occur 
across involved institutions, but also at different international and na-
tional levels including different kinds of actors. 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has contrasted the emergence of the private sector as a cru-
cial actor of peacebuilding with the multiple and often contradictory 
expectations regarding its actual or potential capacity to deliver solu-
tions in transitional societies. At the heart of this puzzle, this paper has 
argued, is a divergence between economic recovery and peacebuilding 
processes and between the understanding of the private sector, of its 
organizational make-up and decision-making processes and of the 
proper ways it should be enlisted by institutions engaged in each type 
of work. A reflection of the gap, this paper has argued, is the tendency 
for the group of private sector partners of peacebuilding to stabilize in 
number and specialize in terms of origins of capital, size and sector of 
involved companies. While only a critical mass of the private sector 
needs to be included in peacebuilding activity (to provide both re-
sources and political legitimacy), the difficulty to broaden the circle of 
“converted” private sector partners remains an important challenge for 
peacebuilding policy makers. 
 
The UNPBA’s work on the private sector, so far, reflects some of 
these constraints, as reflected in the expectation that microcredit, re-
mittances, and private foundations provide adequate scenarios for 
boosting either economic recovery or peacebuilding. The paper dis-
cusses these recommendations in light of considerations summarized 
in the previous paragraphs and ends with four recommendations for 
the UNPBA directed at capitalizing its role in sustainably attracting 
the private sector to peacebuilding and economic recovery efforts. 
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